Our projections suggest that, if the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) is
correct about the outlook for employment, earnings and inflation, there will be no real growth in median income over the next two years, and only modest growth thereafter. This would leave incomes in 2021-22 more than 15% below where we might have expected before the financial crisis hit, based on historical growth rates -equivalent to over £5,000 per household per year on average.
5. We also project increases in inequality: both because forecast growth in average real earnings would benefit higher-income households more than lower-income ones and because cuts in the real value of benefits will reduce incomes among poorer working-age households. Real incomes are projected to fall among the poorest 20% of households over the next five years, with households with children being particularly affected.
A deep recession and slow recovery means average incomes are currently more than 10% below their long-run trend ... Average incomes rose slightly in the immediate wake of the recession, but declined sharply between 2009-10 and 2011-12 thanks to a large fall in real earnings. Continued weakness in real earnings led to only slow growth in real incomes in the following two years. Between 2013-14 and 2016-17, employment continued to rise and lower inflation boosted real earnings, leading to real income growing by a total of around 6% -roughly in line with the historical trend rate of growth.
Despite that modest recovery over the last three years, average income in 2016-17 is projected to be just 5% above its 2007-08 level. This means it is more than 10% below where we might have reasonably expected back in 2007-08, based on the long-run prerecession trend growth rate. This slow growth has been seen across the regions and nations of the UK (see Appendix B). Figure 2 shows how real median incomes have grown for young adults (aged 22-30), other working-aged adults (aged 31-64) and pensioners (defined here as those aged 65 and over), both before and after deducting housing costs (BHC and AHC). 1 The recession had relatively little impact on median pensioner income, which is projected to have been nearly 15% higher in 2016-17 than in 2007-08. This increase is the result of both some individual pensioners experiencing growth in incomes from one year to the next (for example, as a result of the 'triple lock' on the state pension) and, importantly, the fact that those newly retiring tend to have larger pension entitlements than previous waves of retirees.
By contrast, young adults were hit hard by the recession, with median income for that group falling by more than 10% between 2007-08 and 2012-13. Their incomes have since bounced back relatively strongly, but their median income is only now recovering the level it was at in 2007-08.
Those aged between 31 and 64 were less affected by the recession than young adults, but slow growth since means their average incomes are only slightly higher than in 2007-08. 1 Note that these averages do not say anything about the prospects of particular young or old people, as the individuals included in the groups change over time as people age. This is particularly important for those over 65, where part of the reason for strong growth is the higher pension entitlements of the newly retiring. If measured on an after-housing-costs (AHC) basis -which there is a strong case forinequality is little changed, with similar growth across most of the distribution. This is driven by the falls in mortgage interest rates during the recession benefiting higherincome households by more than low-income ones, which mostly offset the reduction in inequality seen in BHC incomes.
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These changes leave inequality around the same level as it was in the early 1990s, following the big increases in the 1980s. Note however that the share of income going to the top 1% of households rose significantly between the early 1990s and the onset of the recession (it has since fallen back slightly). Figure 4 shows the path of overall and child absolute after-housing-costs (AHC) poverty since 1997-98, measured using the government's official absolute poverty line (fixed at 60% of 2010-11 median income in real terms).
Since the real incomes of poorer households (after accounting for housing costs) have grown little since the recession, absolute poverty -which compares incomes to a fixed real-terms poverty line -has not fallen much over the past decade: 2 percentage points across the population as a whole, and 3 percentage points among children. There is little difference in poverty trends among pensioners, working-age parents and working-age adults without children.
This comes in stark contrast to the previous decade: between 1997-98 and 2007-08, absolute poverty fell by 13 percentage points overall, mainly thanks to sharp falls in absolute pensioner poverty and a 15 percentage point fall in absolute child poverty. Note, though, that the end of the period of steep declines in absolute poverty was a few years before the financial crisis hit, from around 2004-05. Looking forward, Figure 5 shows historical and projected growth rates for real median income based upon forecasts from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and the government's current policy plans. 3 The vertical black bars indicate our projections for income growth if earnings grew 1 percentage point per year faster or slower than the OBR forecast. The figure shows that -if the OBR's forecasts turn out to be right and the government follows through on its plans -we would expect no growth in real median income at all over the next two years.
Beyond that, our projections suggest that while income growth will be somewhat stronger, it will still be well below the long-run trend of 2% a year, leaving median income less than 5% higher in 2021-22 than it was in 2016-17. This weak projected growth is largely explained by the OBR's expectations that real earnings will grow slowly over the next five years. Indeed, even if earnings grow 1 percentage point faster than the OBR forecast -which would imply stronger growth than almost all forecasters expect -we still project annual income growth would be below its historical average of 2%.
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These projections use the OBR's November 2016 forecast, rather than the March 2017 forecast. However, for the variables we use (primarily earnings, inflation and employment), there was little change between the two, and so our projections are little affected. This is discussed in further detail in Appendix A. figure, we also illustrate 'high' and 'low' earnings scenarios, under which earnings grow 1 percentage point per year faster or slower than the OBR expects. The figure shows that five years from now, real median income is likely to be more than 15% below where we might have expected before the recession given the long-run trendeven if earnings grow 1 percentage point faster each year than the OBR expects (the 'high earnings' scenario). This gap is equivalent to over £5,000 per household. There is no point over the last 60 years at which average income has been so far below the level implied by its historical trend growth rate.
Despite this spectacularly poor period of income growth, it is worth remembering that even in our low earnings scenario, the level of real median income in 2021-22 is likely to be around double what it was in the early 1980s. 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994-95 1997- While income inequality has fallen slightly since the recession, Figure 7 shows a projected increase in inequality over the next five years. We project real income falls at the 10 th and 20 th percentiles, particularly when measured on an AHC basis, and modest rises in the top half of the income distribution.
The reason for this pattern is twofold. First, the OBR expects real earnings to rise over the period but employment to be little changed. Since earnings make up a larger share of income for higher-income households, rising real earnings tend to benefit higher-income households more than lower-income ones. Conversely, rising employment tends to benefit lower-income households more than earnings growth for those already in work.
Hence if OBR forecasts turn out to have been over-optimistic on earnings growth and under-optimistic on employment growth, inequality would likely increase by less than projected (and may not increase at all). In fact, this is essentially what has happened over the past five years.
The second reason for the projected rise in inequality is cuts to working-age benefits.
Since the vast majority of working-age benefit spending is targeted at lower-income households, real cuts in these benefits tend to reduce incomes among those households the most. Of particular importance here is the freeze in working-age benefit rates until March 2020, the limiting of entitlement to two children in tax credits, and the roll-out of universal credit. Figure 8 shows our projection for overall and child absolute poverty, measured on an AHC basis. We project a rise in absolute child poverty (implying a real fall in the incomes of lowincome families with children), taking it back to around the rate it was at in the early 2000s. This increase is explained by planned cuts to working-age benefits, which are a major source of income for these households.
Our projection suggests little change in overall absolute poverty rates in the coming years, extending the pattern seen since 2004-05. This stability might seem somewhat surprising since we project real AHC income falls at the 10 th and 20 th percentiles of the distribution.
The explanation is that our projections suggest falls in income only in the bottom 20% or so of the income distribution. Since the poverty rate is around 20%, incomes are projected to fall primarily for the part of the distribution already below the poverty line. 
